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Abstrat: This paper presents two attaks against Ahterbahn-128/80, the last version ofone of the stream ipher proposals in the eSTREAM projet. The attak against the 80-bitvariant, Ahterbahn-80, has omplexity 256.32. The attak against Ahterbahn-128 requires
275.4 operations and 261 keystream bits. These attaks are based on an improvement of theattak due to Hell and Johansson against Ahterbahn version 2 and also on an algorithmthat makes prot of the short lengths of the onstituent registers.Key-words: eSTREAM, stream iphers, Ahterbahn, orrelation attaks, parity heks,ryptanalysis
Cryptanalyse de Ahterbahn-128/80Résumé : Ce papier présente deux attaques sur Ahterbahn-128/80, la dernière versiond'un des algorithmes proposés dans le adre de eSTREAM. L'attaque sur la version de 80bits, Ahterbahn-80, est en 256.32. L'attaque sur Ahterbahn-128 a besoin de 275.4 alulset 261 bits de suite hirante. Ces attaques sont basées sur une amélioration de l'attaqueproposée par Hell et Johansson sur la version 2 d'Ahterbahn et aussi sur un algorithme quitire prot des petites longueurs des registres.Mots-lés : eSTREAM, hirement à ot, Ahterbahn, attaques par orrélation, relationsde parité, ryptanalyse
Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80 31 IntrodutionAhterbahn [4, 6℄ is a stream ipher proposal submitted to the eSTREAM projet. After theryptanalysis of the rst two versions [8, 7℄, it has moved on to a new one alled Ahterbahn-128/80 [5℄ published in June 2006. Ahterbahn-128/80 orresponds to two keystream gen-erators with key sizes of 128 bits and 80 bits, respetively. Their maximal keystream lengthis limited to 263.We present here two attaks against both generators. The attak against the 80 bitvariant, Ahterbahn-80, has omplexity 256.32. The attak against Ahterbahn-128 requires
275.4 operations and 261 keystream bits. These attaks are based on an improvement of theattak against Ahterbahn version 2 and also on an algorithm that makes prot of the shortlengths of the onstituent registers.The paper is organized as follows. Setion 2 presents the main speiations of Ahterbahn-128/80. Setion 3 then desribes the general priniple of the attak proposed by Hell andJohansson [7℄ against the previous version of the ipher Ahterbahn v2, sine our attaks relyon a similar tehnique. We also exhibit a new attak against Ahterbahn v2 with omplexity
249.8, while the best previously known attak had omplexity 259. Setion 4 then presentstwo attaks against Ahterbahn-80 and Ahterbahn-128 respetively.1.1 Main speiations of Ahterbahn-128Ahterbahn-128 is a keystream generator, onsisting of 13 binary nonlinear feedbak shiftregisters (NLFSRs). The length of register i is Li = 21 + i for i = 0, 1, . . . , 12. TheseNLFSRs are primitive in the sense that their periods Ti are equal to 2Li − 1. The sequenewhih is used as an input to the Boolean ombining funtion is not the output sequene ofthe NLFSR diretly, but a shifted version of itself. The shift amount depends on the registernumber, but it is xed for eah register. In the following, xi = (xi(t))t≥0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 12denotes the shifted version of the output of the register i at time t.The output of the keystream generator at time t, denoted by S(t), is the one of theBoolean ombining funtion F with the inputs orresponding to the output sequenes of theNLFSRs orretly shifted, i.e. S(t) = F (x0(t), . . . , x12(t)). The Boolean ombining funtion
F is given by:
F (x0, x1, ..., x12) = x0 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x7 + x9 + x11 + x12 + x0x5 + x2x10 +
x2x11 +x4x8 +x4x12 +x5x6 +x6x8 +x6x10 +x6x11 +x6x12 +x7x8 +x7x12 +x8x9 +x8x10 +
x9x10 +x9x11 +x9x12 +x10x12 +x0x5x8 +x0x5x10 +x0x5x11 +x0x5x12 +x1x2x8 +x1x2x12 +
x1x4x10 + x1x4x11 + x1x8x9 + x1x9x10 + x1x9x11 + x1x9x12 + x2x3x8 + x2x3x12 + x2x4x8 +
x2x4x10 +x2x4x11 +x2x4x12 +x2x7x8 +x2x7x12 +x2x8x10 +x2x8x11 +x2x9x10 +x2x9x11 +
x2x10x12 +x2x11x12 +x3x4x8 +x3x4x12 +x3x8x9 +x3x9x12 +x4x7x8 +x4x7x12 +x4x8x9 +
x4x9x12+x5x6x8+x5x6x10+x5x6x11+x5x6x12+x6x8x10+x6x8x11+x6x10x12+x6x11x12+
x7x8x9 + x7x9x12 + x8x9x10 + x8x9x11 + x9x10x12 + x9x11x12 + x0x5x8x10 + x0x5x8x11 +
x0x5x10x12 + x0x5x11x12 + x1x2x3x8 + x1x2x3x12 + x1x2x7x8 + x1x2x7x12 + x1x3x5x8 +
x1x3x5x12 + x1x3x8x9 + x1x3x9x12 + x1x4x8x10 + x1x4x8x11 + x1x4x10x12 + x1x4x11x12 +RR n° 6014
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x1x5x7x8 + x1x5x7x12 + x1x7x8x9 + x1x7x9x12 + x1x8x9x10 + x1x8x9x11 + x1x9x10x12 +
x1x9x11x12 + x2x3x4x8 + x2x3x4x12 + x2x3x5x8 + x2x3x5x12 + x2x4x7x8 + x2x4x7x12 +
x2x4x8x10 + x2x4x8x11 + x2x4x10x12 + x2x4x11x12 + x2x5x7x8 + x2x5x7x12 + x2x8x9x10 +
x2x8x9x11 + x2x9x10x12 + x2x9x11x12 + x3x4x8x9 + x3x4x9x12 + x4x7x8x9 + x4x7x9x12 +
x5x6x8x10 + x5x6x8x11 + x5x6x10x12 + x5x6x11x12.Its main ryptographi properties are : balanedness algebrai degree = 4 orrelation immunity order = 8 nonlinearity = 3584 algebrai immunity = 41.2 Main speiations of Ahterbahn-80Ahterbahn-80 onsists of 11 registers, whih are the same ones as in the above ase, exeptfor the rst and the last ones. The Boolean ombining funtion, G, is a sub-funtion of F :
G(x1, . . . , x11) = F (0, x1, . . . , x11, 0).Its main ryptographi properties are : balanedness algebrai degree = 4 orrelation immunity order = 6 nonlinearity = 896 algebrai immunity = 4As we an see, Ahterbahn-128 ontains Ahterbahn-80 as a substruture.1.3 The key-loading algorithmThe key-loading algorithm uses the key K and an initial value IV . The method for initial-izing the registers is the following one: rst of all, all registers are lled with the bits of
K||IV . After that, register i is loked a−Li times where a is the number of bits of K||IV ,and the remaining bits of K||IV are added to the feedbak bit. Then, eah register outputsone bit. Those bits are taken as input on the Boolean ombining funtion, whih outputs
INRIA
Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80 5a new bit. This bit is now added to the feedbaks for 32 additional lokings. Then weoverwrite the last ell of eah register with a 1, in order to avoid the all zero state.This algorithm has been modied in relation to the previous versions. The aim of thismodiation is to prevent the attaker from reovering the key K from the knowledge of theinitial states of some registers.2 Attak against Ahterbahn version 2 with omplexityof 249.82.1 Priniple of Hell and Johansson attak against Ahterbahn v2Ahterbahn version 2 was the previous version of Ahterbahn. The main and most importantdierenes to this last one, whih are used by the attak are that: it had 10 registers, with lengths between 19 and 32 bits, the Boolean funtion, f , had orrelation immunity order 5.This version has been broken by Johansson and Hell [7℄. Their attak is a distinguishingattak that relies on the following well-known lemma, whih is a partiular ase of [1, Th.6℄.Lemma 1 Let X be a random variable that takes its values into F2 with a distribution Dlose to the uniform distribution that isPrD[X = 1] = 1
2
(1 + ε)with |ε| ≪ 1.Then, for a number of samples
N =
d
ε2where d is a real number, the error probability of the optimal distinguisher is approximately
Φ(−
√
d/2), where Φ is the distribution funtion of the standard normal distribution:
Φ(x) =
1
2π
∫ x
−∞
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt.In the following, we will onsider d = 1 whih orresponds to an error probability ofabout 0.3. The previous quantity ε that measures the distane between D and the uniformdistribution is alled the bias of D.The attak proposed by Hell and Johansson exploits a quadrati approximation q of theombining funtion f :
q(y1, . . . , yn) =
s
∑
j=1
yij +
m
∑
i=1
(yjiyki)RR n° 6014
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iawith m quadrati terms and whih satisesPr[f(y1, . . . , yn) = q(y1, . . . , yn)] = 1
2
(1 + ε).We build the parity-hek equations, as the ones introdued by [8℄, that make disappearthe quadrati terms by summing up:
q(t) =
s
∑
j=1
xij (t) +
m
∑
i=1
xji(t)xki (t)at 2m dierent moments (t+τ) moments, where τ varies in the set of the linear ombinationswith 0− 1 oeients of Tj1Tk1 , Tj2Tk2 , . . . , TjmTkm . In the following, this set is denoted by
〈Tj1Tk1 , . . . , TjmTkm〉, i.e:
〈Tj1Tk1 , . . . , TjmTkm〉 =
{
n
∑
i=1
ciTjiki , c1, . . . , cm ∈ {0, 1}
}
.This leads to
pc(t) =
∑
τ∈〈Tj1Tk1 ,...,Tjm Tkm 〉
q(t + τ)
=
∑
τ∈〈Tj1Tk1 ,...,Tjm Tkm 〉
(xi1(t + τ) + . . . + xis(t + τ)) .We then deimate the sequene (pc(t))t≥0 by the periods of p sequenes among (xi1(t))t≥0, . . . , (xis(t))t≥0.We an suppose here without loss of generality that the periods of the rst p sequenes havebeen hosen.Now a new parity-hek, pcp, an be dened by:
pcp(t) = pc(tTi1 . . . Tip).This way, the inuene of those p registers on the parity-hek pcp(t) orresponds to theaddition of a onstant for all t ≥ 0, so it will be 0 or 1 for all the parity-heks.Now, the attak onsists in performing an exhaustive searh for the initial states of the
(s − p) remaining registers, i.e. those of indies ip+1, . . . , is. For eah possible values forthese initial states, we ompute:
σ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈Tj1Tk1 ,...,Tjm Tkm 〉

S(tTi1 . . . Tip + τ) +
s
∑
j=p+1
xij (tTi1 . . . Tip + τ)

 (1)We have Pr[σ(t) = 0] = 1
2
(1 + ε2
m
).Using this bias, we an distinguish the keystream (S(t))t≥0 from a random sequene andalso reover the initial states of (s − p) onstituent registers. INRIA
Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80 72.2 Complexity We will have 2m terms in eah parity-hek. That means that we need to ompute
ε−2
m+1
= 2nb2
m+1 values of σ(t) for mounting the distinguishing attak, where nb =
log2 ε
−1. Besides, σ(t) is dened by (1), implying that the attak requires
2nb2
m+1+
∑ p
j=1
Lij +
m
∑
i=1
2Lji+Lki keystream bits,where Lij are the lengths of the registers assoiated to the periods by whih we havedeimated, and the last term orresponds to the maximal distane between the bitsinvolved in eah parity-hek. Time omplexity will be
2m2nb2
m+1+
∑ s
j=p+1
Lijwhere ip+1, . . . , is are the indies of the registers by whih period we have not de-imated, so the registers over whom we have made an exhaustive searh and whoseinitial state we are going to nd.2.3 Example with Ahterbahn version 2Hell and Johansson [7℄ have used this attak against Ahterbahn version 2 with the followingquadrati approximation:
Q(x1, . . . , x10) = x1 + x2 + x3x8 + x4x6.Then, they deimate by the period of the seond register, whose length is 22. After that, theymake an exhaustive searh over the rst register, whose length is 19. Time omplexity willbe 262 and data omplexity 259.02. Using the small lengths of the registers, time omplexityan be redued below data omplexity, so the nal omplexity of the attak will be 259.02.2.4 Improvement of the Attak against Ahterbahn version 2We are going to improve the previously desribed attak against Ahterbahn v2 and weredue the omplexity to 249.8.For this attak, we use the idea of assoiating the variables in order to redue the numberof terms that we will have in the parity-heks. The only eet that this ould have on thenal omplexity of the attak is to enlarge the number of required keystream bits; but beingareful, we make it stay the same while reduing the time omplexity.The hosen approximation. At rst, we searhed between all the quadratis approx-imations of f with one and two quadrati terms, as the original attak presented by Helland Johansson was based on a quadrati approximation. Finally, after looking after a trade-o between the number of terms, the number of variables, the bias... we found that noneRR n° 6014
8 Naya Plaseniaquadrati approximation was better for this attak than linear ones. It is worth notiingthat, sine the ombining funtion f is 5-resilient, any approximation of f involves at least6 input variables. Moreover, the highest bias orresponding to an approximation of f by a6-variable funtion is ahieved by a funtion of degree one as proved in [3℄. After analyzingall linear approximations of the Boolean ombining funtion, we found that the best onewas:
g(x1, . . . , x10) = x8 + x6 + x4 + x3 + x2 + x1.We have f(x1, . . . , x10) = g(x1, . . . , x10) with a probability of 12 (1 + 2−3).Parity-heks. Let us build a parity-hek as follows:
ggg(t) = g(t) + g(t + T1T8) + g(t + T2T6) + g(t + T1T8 + T2T6),with
g(t) = x8(t) + x6(t) + x4(t) + x3(t) + x2(t) + x1(t).The terms x8, x6, x2, x1 will disappear and, so, ggg(t) is a sequene that depends uniquely onthe sequenes x3 and x4. Adding four times the approximation has the eet of multiplyingthe bias four times, so the bias of
σ(t) = S(t) + S(t + T1T8) + S(t + T2T6) + S(t + T1T8 + T2T6)is 2−3×4 = 2−12 beause 4 is the number of terms in ggg(t). That means that we will need
23×4×2 = 224 values of the parity-hek for deteting this bias. If we deimate ggg(t) by theperiod of register 3, we will need
224T3 + T1T8 + T2 + T6 = 2
24+23 + 229+19 + 227+22
= 249.8 bits of keystream,and time omplexity will be
224 × 2L4 = 249as we only guess the initial state of register 4.We onsider that the total omplexity is given by the data omplexity, as it is higherthan the time omplexity. This omplexity is 249.8 while the omplexity of the previousattak was equal to 259.3 Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80Now, we desribe a new attak against Ahterbahn-80 with a omplexity of 256.32 where alinear approximation of the output funtion is onsidered. The attak is a distinguishingattak but it also allows to reover the initial states of ertain onstituent registers. We alsodesribe an attak against Ahterbahn-128 with a omplexity of 275.4 where we onsider alinear approximation of the output funtion and we make prot of the short lengths of theregisters involved in the proposed stream ipher. INRIA
Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80 93.1 Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-80This attak is very similar to the improvement of the attak against Ahterbahn version 2whih has been desribed in the previous setion.Our attak exploits the following linear approximation of the ombining funtion G:
ℓ(x1, . . . , x11) = x1 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x10.Sine G is 6-resilient, ℓ is the best approximation by a 7-variable funtion.For ℓ(t) = x1(t) + x3(t) + x4(t) + x5(t) + x6(t) + x7(t) + x10(t), the keystream (S(t))t≥0satises Pr[S(t) = ℓ(t)] = 12 (1 − 2−3).Parity-heks. Let us build a parity-hek as follows:
ℓℓ(t) = ℓ(t) + ℓ(t + T4T7) + ℓ(t + T6T5) + ℓ(t + T4T7 + T6T5).The terms ontaining the sequenes x4, x5, x6, x7 vanish in ℓℓ(t), so ℓℓ(t) depends exlusivelyon the sequenes x1, x3 and x10.Adding four times the approximation has the eet of multiplying the bias four times,so the bias of
σ(t) = S(t) + S(t + T7T4) + S(t + T6T5) + S(t + T7T4 + T6T5)where (S(t))t≥0 is the keystream, is 2−4×3. This means that we need 23×4×2 = 224 parity-heks σ(t) to detet this bias.We now deimate σ(t) by the period of the register 10, whih is involved in the parity-hek, so we reate like this a new parity-hek:
σ′(t) = σ(t(231 − 1)).Then, the attak performs an exhaustive searh for the initial states of registers 1 and 3. Itstime omplexity is 224 × 2L1+L3 = 270.The number of keystream bits that we need is
224 × T10 + T4T7 + T6T5 = 256.32.3.2 Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128Now, we present a distinguishing attak against the 128-bit version of Ahterbahn whihalso reovers the initial states of two registers.We onsider the following approximation of the ombining funtion F :
ℓ(x0, . . . , x12) = x0 + x3 + x7 + x4 + x10 + x8 + x9 + x1 + x2.Then, for ℓ(t) = x0(t)+x3(t)+x7(t)+x4(t)+x10(t)+x8(t)+x9(t)+x1(t)+x2(t), we havePr[S(t) = ℓ(t)] = 12 (1 + 2−3).RR n° 6014
10 Naya PlaseniaParity-heks. The period of any sequene obtained by ombining the registers 0, 3 and
7 is equal to lm(T0, T3, T7), i.e. 259.3 as T0 T3 and T7 have ommon divisors. We are goingto denote this value by T0,3,7.If we build a parity hek as follows:
ℓℓℓ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
ℓ(t + τ),the terms ontaining the sequenes x0, x3, x7, x4, x10, x8, x9 will disappear from ℓℓℓ(t), so
ℓℓℓ(t) depends exlusively on the sequenes x1 and x2:
ℓℓℓ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
ℓ(t + τ)
=
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
x1(t + τ) + x2(t + τ)
= σ1(t) + σ2(t),where σ1(t) and σ2(t) are the parity-heks alulated on the sequenes generated by NLFSRs1 and 2.Adding eight times the approximation has the eet of multiplying the bias eight times,so the bias of
σ(t) =
∑
τ∈〈T0,3,7,T4,10,T8,9〉
S(t + τ)where (S(t))t≥0 is the keystream, is 2−8×3. So:Pr[σ(t) + σ1(t) + σ2(t) = 1] = 1
2
(1 − ε8).This means that we need 23×8×2 = 248 values of σ(t) + σ1(t) + σ2(t) to detet this bias.We now desribe an algorithm for omputing the sum σ(t)+σ1(t)+σ2(t) over all valuesof t. This algorithm has a lower omplexity than an exhaustive searh for the initial statesof the registers 1 and 2 simultaneously. Here we use (248 − 2) values of t sine (248 − 2) =
T2 × (225 + 2).
INRIA
Cryptanalysis of Ahterbahn-128/80 11We an write it down as follows:
248−3
∑
t′=0
σ(t′) ⊕ ℓℓℓ(t′) =
T2−1
∑
k=0
225+1
∑
t=0
σ(T2t + k) ⊕ ℓℓℓ(T2t + k)
=
T2−1
∑
k=0
225+1
∑
t=0
σ(T2t + k) ⊕ σ1(T2t + k) ⊕ σ2(T2t + k)
=
T2−1
∑
k=0

(σ2(k) ⊕ 1)


225+1
∑
t=0
σ(T2t + k) ⊕ σ1(T2t + k)

 +
σ2(k)

(225 + 2) −
225+1
∑
t=0
σ(T2t + k) ⊕ σ1(T2t + k)



 ,sine σ2(T2t + k) is onstant for a xed value of k.At this point, we an obtain σ(t) from the keystream and we an make an exhaustivesearh for the initial state of register 1. More preisely: We hoose an initial state for register 2, e.g. the all one initial state. We ompute andsave a binary vetor V2 of length T2:
V2[k] = σ2(k),where the sequene x2 is generated from the hoosen initial state. The omplexity ofthis state is T2 × 23 operations. For eah possible initial state of register 1: we ompute and save a vetor V1 omposed of T2 integers of 26 bits.
V1[k] =
225+1
∑
t=0
σ(T2t + k) ⊕ σ1(T2t + k).The omplexity of this state is:
248 × (24 + 24.7) = 253.4for eah possible initial state of register 1, where 24 orresponds to the numberof operations required for omputing eah (σ(t) + σ1(t)) and (225 + 2) × 24.7 =
(225 + 2) × 26 is the ost of summing up 225 + 2 integers of 26 bits. For eah possible i from 0 to T2 − 1:
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ia* we dene V ′2 of length T2:
V ′2 [k] = V2[k + i mod T2].Atually, (V ′2 [k])k<T2 orresponds to (σ2(k))k<T2 when the initial state ofregister 2 orresponds to internal state after loking R2 i times from the allone initial state.* With the two vetors that we have obtained, we ompute:
T2−1
∑
k=0
[
(V ′2 [k] ⊕ 1)V1[k] + V ′2 [k]
(
225 + 2 − V1[k]
)]
. (2)When we do this with the orret initial states of registers 1 and 2, we will nd theexpeted bias.for eah possible initial state of R1 dofor k = 0 to T2 − 1 do
V1[k] =
∑225+1
t=0 σ(T2t + k) ⊕ σ1(T2t + k)end forfor eah possible initial i state of R2 dofor k = 0 to T2 − 1 do
V ′2 [k] = V2[k + i mod T2]end for
∑T2−1
k=0
[
(V ′2 [k] ⊕ 1)V1[k] + V ′2 [k]
(
225 + 2 − V1[k]
)]if we nd the bias thenreturn the initial states of R1 and R2end ifend forend forTable 1: Algorithm for nding the initial states of registers 1 and 2The total time omplexity of the attak is going to be:
T1 ×
[
248 ×
(
24 + 24.7
)
+ T2 × 2 × T2 × 24.7
]
+ T2 × 23 = 275.4,where 2 × T2 × 24.7 is the time it takes to ompute the sum desribed by (2). Atually, wean speed up the proess by rewriting the sum (2) in the following way
T2−1
∑
k=0
(−1)V2[k+i]
(
V1[k] −
225 + 2
2
)
+ T2
225 + 2
2The issue is now to nd the i that maximizes this sum, this is the same as omputing themaximum of the rossorrelation of two sequenes of length T2. We an do that eientlyINRIA
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hterbahn-128/80 13using a fast Fourier transform as explained in [2, pages 306-312℄. The nal omplexity willbe in O(T2 log T2). Anyway, this does not hange our total omplexity as the higher term isthe rst one.The omplexity is going to be, nally:
T1 ×
[
248 ×
(
24 + 24.7
)
+ O(T2 log T2)
]
+ T2 × 23 = 275.4.The length of keystream needed is:
T0,3,7 + T4,10 + T8,9 + 2
48 < 261 bits.4 ConlusionWe have proposed an attak against Ahterbahn-80 in 270. To this attak we an apply thesame algorithm as the one desribed in Setion 3.2 against Ahterbahn-128, and its timeomplexity will be redued to about 245, so we an onsider as the total omplexity thelength of the keystream needed, sine it is bigger. The omplexity of the attak againstAhterbahn-80 will then be 256.32. An attak against Ahterbahn-128 is also proposed in
275.4 where fewer than 261 bits of keystream are required. The omplexities of the bestattaks against all versions of Ahterbahn are summarized in the following table:version data omplexity time omplexity referenesv1 (80-bit) 232 255 [8℄v2 (80-bit) 259.02 262 [7℄v2 (80-bit) 249.8 249v80 (80-bit) 256.32 246v128 (128-bit) 260 275.4Table 2: Attaks omplexities against all versions of AhterbahnReferenes[1℄ T. Baignères, P. Junod, and S. Vaudenay. How far an we go beyond linear ryptanal-ysis? In Advanes in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2004, volume 3329 of Leture Notes inComputer Siene, pages 432450. Springer-Verlag, 2004.[2℄ R. E. Blahut. Fast Algorithms for Digital Signal Proessing. Addison Wesley, 1985.[3℄ A. Canteaut and M. Trabbia. Improved fast orrelation attaks using parity-hek equa-tions of weight 4 and 5. In Advanes in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2000, volume 1807of Leture Notes in Computer Siene, pages 573588. Springer-Verlag, 2000.RR n° 6014
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t, Report 2005/002, 2005. http://www.erypt.eu.org/stream/iphers/a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t, Report 2006/001, 2006. http://www.e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